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CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: A TERRITORIAL SOLUTION
Steven Bradford*
I. INTRODUCTION
Choice-of-law issues have always been among the most difficult le-
gal issues. Legal questions that are difficult when only one state is in-
volved become herculean when a choice must be made from among the
different laws of several jurisdictions. The difficulty of conflicts law is
increased by the theoretical quarrels among courts and scholars. Schol-
ars and judges are unable to agree on an underlying theory of choice of
law, much less the result in particular cases.' A number of different
approaches compete for attention,2 producing an eclectic body of case
law. 3
Originally, "vested rights" territorialism dominated choice of law.
Courts applied the law of the state where the cause of action or legal
right vested or accrued.5 However, this approach, best represented by
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,6 often produced dissatisfying re-
sults. The result was often ambiguous in tough cases; courts frequently
disagreed about where particular rights vested.' Conscious or uncon-
scious manipulation was possible. Further, many of the territorial rules
in the First Restatement had no particular anchor in policy.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.S. 1978, Utah
State University; J.D. 1982, Harvard Law School; M.P.P. 1982, Harvard University. I am grate-
ful to participants in colloquia at Southern Methodist University School of Law and the Univer-
sity of Nebraska College of Law for their comments on the arguments herein. I wish to thank
Professors John Hart Ely, Lea Brilmayer, Josephine Potuto and Roger Kirst for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to thank Lisa Liekhus, University of Nebraska College of
Law Class of 1992, for her helpful research assistance.
1. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521, 586
(1983).
2. See generally R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 255-
80 (4th ed. 1986).
3. See generally Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34
MERCER L. REV. 645 (1983).
4. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, at 255.
5. See, e.g., J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1834).
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT].
7. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, at 256-61.
Bradford in University of Pittsburgh Law Review 52 (1990-1991). Copyright 1991, University of Pittsburgh. Used by permission.
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Dissatisfaction with vested rights territorialism led to the proposal
of alternative approaches, many of which fall under the general head-
ing of interest analysis and trace their roots to the work of Professor
Brainerd Currie.' The key to most of the modern approaches is the
identification of policy interests a state might have in applying its law
to the particular case before the court. Interest analysis and its variants
have been popular and have been embraced by many courts, but inter-
est analysis has also produced dissatisfaction. It is just as manipulable
and misunderstood as vested rights territorialism, probably more so be-
cause the subjectivity of interest analysis allows for mistakes even in
easy cases. 9 Critics have also charged that interest analysts artificially
limit state policy concerns to simplify choice-of-law analysis. 10 One
scholar charges that interest analysis suffers from pro-resident, pro-fo-
rum, and pro-recovery biases," reflecting "nothing more than the unex-
plained value preferences of its proponents."' 2
These problems have led some to reject interest analysis and reaf-
firm territorialism;' 3 over one-fourth of the states still adhere to tradi-
tional First Restatement territorialism."' The Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws15 responds with a combination of territorialism, inter-
est analysis, and a mishmash of other ideas."6 The Second Restatement
fails miserably at reducing the ambiguity and manipulation inherent in
the modern, policy-based approaches.17 Its compromise approach can
8. See infra text accompanying notes 54-62.
9. Interest analysis "enables ... [judges] ... to reach the results they desire. . . . It
'works,' because it works with mirrors. It is a gigantic escape device, for judges are able to pull
any number of policies and interests out of a hat if it suits their purposes. ... Juenger, What
Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509, 524 (1985). See also Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A
House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 459 (1985).
10. See sources cited infra note 56.
11. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392,
398-99 (1980). Professor Solimine's empirical investigation confirms that the modern theories are
relatively more pro-plaintiff and pro-forum law than the traditional lex loci approach. Solimine,
An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 86-88 (1989).
12. Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 461.
13. See, e.g., Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986); Twerski, Enlightened
Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 373 (1971).
14. Solimine, supra note 11, at 54.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969). See Reppy, supra note 3,
at 655-66 (conceding that (the Second Restatement has been read this way, but arguing that it was
intended to be primarily a territorial method).
17.
[T]he Restatement Second may fail to provide enough guidance to the courts to produce
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be used to justify virtually any choice of law. In spite of its problems,
however, the Second Restatement has also been popular with the
courts. One scholar claims that almost half of the states follow the Sec-
ond Restatement.18
No consensus approach has emerged; the opinions of conflicts
scholars and courts are as diffuse today as they have ever been. 19 There
is "profound disagreement" among scholars concerning the proper
methodology for handling choice-of-law cases.20 Part of the problem is
that scholars are viewing the problem too broadly. Most conflicts schol-
ars are searching for a single, grand theory acceptable for all cases.
The result is a broad, vaguely worded standard that provides little
guidance in particular cases.2"
In their rush to describe the majesty and scope of the choice-of-
law forest, scholars have missed the details of individual trees. Substan-
tive legal rules differ in ways that a global choice-of-law theory cannot
capture; more particularized treatment is needed. We must ask what
particular approach or rule works well in particular types of cases.22
Some scholars have argued that their general approaches will eventu-
ally lead to particular rules,23 but this view is backwards. We must first
focus on specific areas of the law and adopt narrow, particular rules
that fit each area well. Those narrow rules may eventually lead to a
more generally applicable common approach or set of approaches, or
even a semblance of uniformity among the states following its method. In the drafters'
attempt to mollify their critics, they have created an umbrella for traditionalist and modern
theorist alike: a fragile shelter that may prove itself unable to survive any but the most
gentle of showers.
Kay, supra note 1, at 562. See also infra text accompanying notes 100-28.
18. Solimine, supra note I1, at 54 n.32.
19. The only issue as to which a consensus has emerged is the rejection of the traditional
First Restatement approach. See Kay, supra note I, at 586.
20. Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of
the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 577, 615 (1980). "The tidal wave of creative effort
that followed the collapse of the First Restatement has receded, leaving isolated, stagnant pools of
doctrine, each jealously guarded by its adherents." Id.
21.
For all too long, conflicts scholars have engaged in jurisprudential cerebrations without
much regard for the consequences of the rules and approaches they have advocated. There
is a widespread belief that the conflicts of laws is different from all other legal disciplines in
that practical results and workability do not matter.
Juenger, supra note 9, at 523.
22. Perhaps this will also stop the focus on guest statutes, interspousal immunity, coverture,
and other vestiges of the past. See Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 551-53 (W. Va. 1986).
23. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 323-25 (1972).
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perhaps the elusive grand theory that fits a broad range of cases does
not exist. Whether or not a grand, comprehensive solution eventually
results, choice-of-law analysis will benefit from improvements to the
specific rules applied to particular types of cases.
My focus in this Article is on the choice-of-law problems associ-
ated with the attorney-client privilege. When a court is faced with a
claim of attorney-client privilege, and there are factual connections to
more than one state, which state's law should determine the scope of
the privilege? To take an extreme example, assume that the forum is
State A, the party asserting the privilege is from State B, the attorney
with whom the client conferred practices in State C, their communica-
tion occurred in State D, the other parties to the case are from State E,
and the lawsuit involves activities occurring in State F. Which state's
law determines whether the client's communications with his attorney
are protected?
Why examine the attorney-client privilege rather than some other
substantive area? First, it is an area of the law where there is general
agreement on substantive policy and the reasons for that policy. Instead
of debating the merits of the attorney-client privilege, the focus can be
on the choice-of-law issues. Second, it is an area of conflicts law where
there is considerable disagreement about the appropriate result. The
available choice-of-law theories and the cases support practically any
result. Third, the case law and scholarly commentary are manageable
enough to allow a fairly detailed look at the available theories, the ap-
plications of those theories, and the policy issues. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the cases and commentary have generally missed the salient
features of the problem. Scholars have not noticed that the existing
theories do not fit the attorney-client privilege well.
All of the existing approaches-interest analysis, the law-of-the-
forum approach of the First Restatement, the most significant relation-
ship approach of the Second Restatement, and others-fail when ap-
plied to the attorney-client privilege. Certainty and predictability are
essential if the attorney-client privilege is to serve its purpose and none
of these approaches produces a certain, predictable result. Only a terri-
torial rule will allow an attorney and client to know in advance whether
their communications will be protected, and for this reason only a terri-
torial rule will enhance the effectiveness of legal representation as the
attorney-client privilege is meant to do. But what territorial rule? I ex-
amine the possible rules and conclude that the most sensible rule is
always to apply the privilege law of the attorney's state of practice.
[Vol. 52:909
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The proposed solution has been overlooked because it is a territo-
rial solution and territorialism is not in vogue. Fashion has overcome
function. In the rush to overthrow the First Restatement, all territorial
rules have been rejected,24 but the failure of the First Restatement
rules does not discredit territorialism generally. A territorial rule works
best for the attorney-client privilege; in fact, a territorial rule is the
only approach that works, given the purpose of the privilege. The pro-
posed rule should not be rejected merely because it is unfashionable.
II. THE POLICY UNDERLYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Before examining the choice-of-law issues, we must briefly ex-
amine the attorney-client privilege itself. The attorney-client privilege
is the oldest of the various legally recognized privileges for confidential
communications.25 The rule that an advocate could not be called as a
witness against his client existed in Roman times.2 6 ' It is unclear
whether the Roman tradition influenced the Anglo-Saxon attorney-cli-
ent privilege, 27 but English recognition of the privilege goes back at
least to Elizabethan times.28
The policy justifications for the privilege have evolved over time.
The Roman rule was designed to protect against perjury. The theory
was that an advocate had a strong motive to misstate the facts in favor
of his client; the advocate was not allowed to testify because his testi-
mony could not be believed.29 The English attorney-client privilege was
based originally on the oath and honor of attorneys as "gentlemen" not
to betray confidences reposed in them."0 The attorney could not testify
24. Reese, supra note 23, at 319.
25. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(02), at 503-15 (1990); 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
26. C. MCCORMICK. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 204 (3d ed. 1984); Radin, The
Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488
(1928).
27. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 87, at 204.
28. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2290, at 542. Wigmore cites cases dating back to 1577.
Id. The strength of the English recognition of the privilege prior to the nineteenth century is
disputed. Wigmore contends that the attorney-client privilege has been "unquestioned" since Eliz-
abethan times, id., but Professor Hazard argues that the historical foundations of the privilege are
not as firm as Wigmore's language suggests. According to Hazard, recognition of the attorney-
client privilege was slow and halting until the 1800s. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978). Professor Hazard's article con-
tains a detailed discussion of the history of the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 1070-91.
29. Radin, supra note 26, at 488.
30. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2290, at 543; Radin, supra note 26, at 487.
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not because of any practical risks, but because it was his duty not to
disclose his client's secrets.
By the late eighteenth century, the original English justification
was repudiated and replaced by a new, more utilitarian argument,
which survives today.31 The modern justification focuses on the needs of
the adversary system if it is to produce just results. The attorney-client
privilege
is considered indispensable to the lawyer's function as advocate on the theory
that the advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to dis-
close everything, bad as well as good. The privilege is also considered necessary
to the lawyer's function as confidential counselor in law on the similar theory
that the legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do only if the
client is free to make full disclosure.
3 2
This justification, which has been "virtually unchallenged" in modern
times, 3 rests on three assumptions. First, it assumes that a client will
communicate with counsel more fully and truthfully if attorney-client
communications are protected from disclosure. Second, it assumes that
an attorney can advise her client more effectively if the client is more
forthcoming. Finally, it assumes that the value of the resulting im-
proved legal representation exceeds the cost of undisclosed evidence.
The attorney-client privilege thus represents a tradeoff between ef-
fective legal representation and full disclosure of all pertinent facts.34
The privilege limits the available relevant evidence, seriously impeding
the search for truth, 5 but it does so in pursuit of what is perceived to
be a higher value. "The proposition is that the detriment to justice
from a power to shut off inquiry into pertinent facts in court will be
outweighed by the benefits to justice . . . from a franker disclosure in
the lawyer's office."3 6 The assumption that one outweighs the other is
essentially unverifiable.37
31. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2290, at 543.
32. Hazard, supra note 28, at 1061. See also Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, T 503(02), at 503-16. C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 26, § 87, at 204-05. As Gergacz points out, this benefits the attorney as well as the
client. Gergacz, Attorney-Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAW. 461, 467-68 (1982).
33. Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules. Balancing, and Constitutional Enti-
tlement, 91 HARv. L. REV. 464, 466 (1977). See also Gergacz, supra note 32, at 463 (this ration-
ale "was not questioned in the cases").
34. See, e.g., 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, 503(02), at 503-16; C. MC-
CORMICK, supra note 26, § 87, at 204-05; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2291, at 554.
35. See, e.g., Gergacz, supra note 32, at 468; Radin, supra note 26, at 490.
36. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 87, at 205.
37. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, 503(02), at 503-17. Because it impeded
[Vol. 52:909
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Other rationales have been offered to support the attorney-client
privilege, but none fits particularly well. Several authors argue that the
privilege is based on the public policy against self-incrimination, 8 but
this explanation is partial at best because the privilege is not limited to
criminal defendants or those likely to be criminal defendants. It applies
to all clients, civil and criminal, and may be used by plaintiffs as well
as defendants. More importantly, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion may be waived, and this rationale fails to explain why disclosure to
the attorney is not itself a waiver. There is no waiver only if there is an
expectation of privacy, and there is an expectation of privacy only be-
cause of the privilege. Thus, the self-incrimination rationale assumes its
own conclusion.
Other authors have argued that the privilege is based on a right of
privacy,39 but this explanation is also inadequate.'0 The attorney-client
relationship is not the intimate type of relationship that one would ex-
pect a right of privacy to protect; it is primarily a business relationship,
and business relationships are not usually shielded from discovery.
Other proffered rationales for the attorney-client privilege have also
been repudiated. 4" The best explanation for the attorney-client privilege
is the desire to promote effective legal representation.
III. POSSIBLE APPROACHES
Given the desire to promote effective legal representation, and
given the tradeoff between effective representation and disclosure, what
choice-of-law approach should be chosen? At least six approaches to
choice-of-law have been used or suggested with respect to the attorney-
client privilege. They are the First Restatement's forum law approach,
the public policy approach, interest analysis, the most significant rela-
the search for truth in the individual case, Wigmore argued that the attorney-client privilege
should be "strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle." 8 J. WIGNMORE, supra note 25, § 2291, at 554.
38. See Cain, The Attorney's Obligation of Confidentiality-Its Effect on the Ascertain-
ment of Truth in an Adversary System of Justice, 3 GLENDALE L. REV. 81, 93 (1978-79); Radin,
supra note 26, at 490. One author argues that the individual accused of a crime has a constitu-
tional right to the attorney-client privilege because of a combination of the sixth amendment right
to counsel and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Note, supra note 33,
at 485-86.
39. See Note, supra note 33, at 483.
40. For an excellent discussion rejecting the privacy rationale see id. at 483-84. See also
Sterk, Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 461, 471-72 (1977).
41. See Gergacz, supra note 32, at 465-66.
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tionship test, the compromise approach adopted by section 139 of the
Second Restatement, and the "better law" approach advocated by Pro-
fessor Leflar. I will discuss each of these approaches and how each ap-
plies to the attorney-client privilege. Then, in the next section, I will
propose an alternative and demonstrate why it is preferable to the ex-
isting approaches.
A. The First Restatement Approach and Forum Preference
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws distinguished substantive
and procedural legal issues. All procedural questions were to be deter-
mined by the law of the forum.42 The forum court generally had to
decide according to its own rules whether a given issue was substantive
or procedural, 43 but sections 596 and 597 of the First Restatement ex-
pressly provided that the law of the forum governed issues of "the com-
petency and the credibility of witnesses" '44 and "the admissibility of a
particular piece of evidence."45
Of course, unlike evidentiary rules, the attorney-client privilege
has little to do with the quality or the relevance of the evidence. Unlike
evidence excluded on evidentiary grounds, evidence of attorney-client
communications is generally admissible if the client waives the privi-
lege.4 6 In addition, the attorney is generally competent to testify about
communications with the client if the privilege is waived. Finally, un-
like a rule of evidence, the attorney-client privilege not only precludes
use at trial but also bars discovery of the communication and even dis-
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934). Application of this rule
is not as straightforward as it seems. When a deposition is taken in one state to be used as evi-
dence in a trial in another state, which state is the "forum?" See Comment, Privileged Communi-
cations under Rule 26(b): Conflict of Laws in Diversity Cases, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 704, 710-14
(1956). This Comment concludes that "any attempt to define the concepts 'forum' and 'procedure'
and to reason deductively from such definitions to a solution of the conflict-of-privilege-law prob-
lem is doomed to failure." Id. at 714. Accepting a law-of-the-forum rule when the state of deposi-
tion and the trial forum are the same, id. at 714-15, the Comment proposes an interest-based
approach when they differ, which in most cases results in application of the stronger privilege. Id.
at 715-18.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584 (1934).
44. Id. § 596.
45. Id. § 597. The First Restatement comments offer the following illustration:
A brings an action in state X against B for the wrongful death in state Y of A's husband.
B on the witness stand desires to state a conversation with the deceased immediately after
the accident which eventually caused the death. By the law of Y, such evidence is admissi-
ble, but not by the law of X. The offered evidence is excluded.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597, illustration 1 (1934).
46. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 93; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2327.
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closure of the communication outside of the litigation context. Viewed
narrowly, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege-the promotion of
effective legal representation-might be termed substantive rather than
procedural. The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize a substantive ba-
sis to privilege rules such as this by treating privilege questions as is-
sues of state law in diversity cases. 47 But if procedure is defined more
broadly to include any rule designed to make the process of litigation
unbiased and efficient, 48 the attorney-client privilege seems largely pro-
cedural. The privilege is designed to encourage communications be-
tween attorney and client not because such communications have any
intrinsic value, but because we believe open attorney-client communica-
tions make our dispute-resolution system work better. In this sense, the
attorney-client privilege is procedural.
Since the attorney-client privilege is not a rule of admissibility or
competence, it is not specifically covered by sections 596 or 597 of the
First Restatement; neither the First Restatement nor its comments ex-
pressly deal with privileges or professional relationships. However,
courts accepting the First Restatement's distinction between substance
and procedure have traditionally treated the attorney-client privilege as
a question of evidence or procedure to be resolved by forum law.49
B. Public Policy of the Forum
A second approach also applies the law of the forum, but for dif-
ferent reasons. This approach, which has had limited use, applies forum
privilege law on the ground that it would violate the forum's public
47. FED. R. EvID. 501.
48. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724-25 (1974) (distin-
guishing substance and procedure for purposes of Erie).
49. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. ABC Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Tenn. 1979), is
typical. The plaintiff in that case sought to compel the defendant, a New York corporation, to
produce documents arising out of communications which took place in California between the
defendant and its counsel. Applying the conflicts rules of Tennessee, the court with little discus-
sion concluded that "the Tennessee courts, and particularly its Supreme Court, would hold that in
the present situation the attorney-client privilege is a question of evidence, and that in determining
the scope and validity of the privilege the law of Tennessee would govern." Id. at 474.
See also Drimmer v. Appleton, 628 F. Supp. 1249, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying New
York conflicts law); Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying
federal law). For examples of courts applying this "procedure of the forum" approach to other
types of privileges, see, e.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 989 n.5 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (applying Missouri conflicts law to a question of a reporter's privi-
lege not to disclose news sources); Ghana Supply Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 83 F.R.D.
586, 589 (D. Mass. 1979) (applying Massachusetts conflicts law to a question of governmental
executive privilege).
1991)
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policy to apply the law of another jurisdiction. One of the few attorney-
client privilege cases to accept this rationale is Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc.,5" involving communications with foreign patent agents.
The court recognized that such communications would be protected
under French and British law, but decided that those foreign statutes
contravened
the public policy of the United States as enunciated in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the federal court decisions relating thereto. The federal rules are
designed to promote discovery whereas these two foreign statutes necessarily re-
strict discovery. It is thoroughly established that comity will not be extended to
foreign law or rights based thereon if it opposes settled public policy of the
forum.61
The district court therefore refused to apply the foreign privilege to any
communications "touching base with the United States. 52
The public policy argument is obviously overstated. Courts adopt-
ing this approach have set forth no guidelines for deciding when forum
public policy is strong enough to trump the otherwise applicable rule
and when it is not. Under this reasoning, every privilege could be
viewed as expressing a strong public policy, and the forum could al-
ways apply its own privilege law.5 3 Thus, the public policy argument
produces the same result as the First Restatement approach.
50. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974). In re Franklin Washington Trust Co., I Misc. 2d
697, 698, 148 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1956), might also be considered a public policy case. The court
rejected an argument that the attorney-client privilege concerned only the admissibility of evi-
dence and therefore should be governed by the law of the trial forum. In re Franklin Washington
Trust Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d at 733-34. The opinion could be read as an attempt to analyze the
interests of the respective states, but it at least recites the public policy argument:
Respondents are attorneys in this state and the inquiry concerns professional acts done
here. They should not be allowed to reveal, much less compelled to, any matter which the
public policy of this state deems inviolate. The evil which is sought to be avoided is the
revelation of the confidential matter per se, not the exclusion of testimony which might be
in some way harmful. The restriction of the statute is only an echo of the mandate of the
canon of ethics in that regard and only applies to testimony what is the rule in regard to all
communications in or out of court.
Id. (emphasis added). See also In re Walsh, 40 Misc. 2d 413, 414, 243 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (1963)
(quoting the emphasized language).
51. 397 F. Supp. at 1169.
52. Id. *
53. One might argue that such reasoning requires the application of forum law only when
the forum has a privilege and the other state does not. If the forum has no privilege, it has no
public policy on the issue. The absence of a privilege, however, does not indicate that the forum
lacks a policy, but that it has a policy favoring disclosure. Application of the other state's privilege
law would violate this forum public policy favoring disclosure as much as applying another state's
law requiring disclosure would violate a forum public policy favoring the privilege. Thus, the pub-
[Vol. 52:909
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C. Interest Analysis
Professor Brainerd Currie originated an approach to choice-of-law
questions known as "governmental interest analysis" or simply "inter-
est analysis."' 5' Professor Currie's approach, which has been popular
among scholars and in the courts, focuses on the policy interests under-
lying the laws of each state. Interest analysis asks whether applying a
particular state's law to the particular facts before the court would
serve a policy concern of that state.55 The application of interest analy-
sis produces three categories of cases: (1) false conflicts, where only one
state has a legitimate policy interest in applying its law to the particu-
lar case; (2) so-called unprovided-for cases, where none of the involved
states has a legitimate policy interest in applying its law; and (3) true
lie policy argument usually results in the application of forum law.
54. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). This
book is a collection of Currie's writings on conflicts issues.
55. See B. CURRIE, supra note 54, at 183-84. Reese and Rosenberg provide the latest modi-
fication of Professor Currie's theory before his death:
I. When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state different from the law of the
forum, it should inquire into the policies expressed in the respective laws, and into the
circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest in
the application of those policies. In making these determinations the court should em-
ploy the ordinary processes of construction and interpretation.
2. If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application of its policy in the
circumstances of the case and the other has none, it should apply the law of the only
interested state.
3. If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the two states it should
reconsider. A more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of
one state or the other may avoid conflict.
4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interests
of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum.
5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists between the interests of
two other states, and the court cannot with justice decline to adjudicate the case, it
should apply the law of the forum, at least if that law corresponds with the law of one
of the other states. Alternatively, the court might decide the case by a candid exercise
of legislative discretion, resolving the conflict as it believes it would be resolved by a
supreme legislative body having power to determine which interest should be required
to yield.
6. The conflict of interest between states will result in different dispositions of the same
problem, depending on where the action is brought. If with respect to a particular
problem this appears seriously to infringe a strong national interest in uniformity of
decision, the court should not attempt to improvise a solution sacrificing the legitimate
interest of its own state, but should leave to Congress, exercising its powers under the
full faith and credit clause, the determination of which interest should be required to
yield.
W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 487-88 (9th ed.
1990).
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conflicts, where more than one state has a legitimate policy interest in
applying its law. The key to interest analysis is the discovery' of false
conflicts, where only one state is interested. Where there is a false con-
flict, interest analysts agree that the court should apply the law of the
only interested state.
Interest analysis produces false conflicts by emphasizing primarily
domicile-based policy interests5 6 A state has an interest in applying its
law if doing so would compensate a local plaintiff or protect a local
defendant. Interest analysts sometimes also consider regulatory inter-
ests-independent of the parties' domicile, does a state have an interest
in regulating local conduct? The key is whether the social and eco-
nomic consequences of applying a state's rule to the particular transac-
tionat issue will be felt in that state." In Professor Sedler's words,
when a law reflects a compensatory or protective policy, a state's interest in ap-
plying its law to implement that policy is usually predicated on a party's resi-
dence in that state since it is there that the consequences toward which the com-
pensatory or protective policy is directed are likely to be felt. When a law,
however, reflects a regulatory or admonitory policy, . . . a state's interest in ap-
plying its law to implement that policy is predicated on the connection between
56. See Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile,
1983 UTAH L. REV. 651, 653, 665; Reppy, supra note 3, at 647 n.12; Ely, Choice of Law and the
State's Interest In Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 175-179 (1981); Note,
Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of A Choice of Law Method, 98
YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1989). Currie himself focused on a state's interest in protecting its domicil-
iaries. See B. CURRIE, supra note 54, at 270, 291-93, 417, 704-05, 724-25. Professor Sedler, a
strong proponent of interest analysis, counters that interest analysis recognizes that states some-
times have a policy interest in *applying their law to non-domiciliaries, but Sedler's own analysis
shows that domicile-based interests are usually predominant. See Sedler, Interest Analysis and
Forum Preference in the Conflicts of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics', 34 MERCER L. REV.
593, 620-35 (1983). Even Ely, the strongest critic of this aspect of interest analysis, concedes that
interest analysts sometimes recognize regulatory interests in influencing local behavior. Ely, supra,
at 177. Ely argues, however, that such regulatory interests tend to be ignored or downplayed as
compared to the interests of states in protecting domiciliaries. Id. The focus on a state's domicil-
iaries may be essential to the success of interest analysis:
This protect-the-locals conception forms a crucial element of interest analysis, for it nar-
rows the scope of purportedly conflicting laws. Without such a mechanism to discount state
interests in non-local litigants, all apparent conflicts would be true conflicts and interest
analysis' primary achievement-the identification of false conflicts-would be diminished.
Note, supra, at 600. See also Ely, supra, at 175-76.
57. This is a generalization based on Professor Sedler's treatment of accident liability rules:
In the typical accident case, the relevant interests are compensatory and protective ones,
and a state's interest in applying its law in order to implement those policies indeed de-
pends on a party's residence in that state, since the consequences of the accident and of
imposing or denying liability will be felt by the parties and the insurer in the parties'
home state.
Sedler, supra note 56, at 621 (emphasis in original).
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that state and the conduct sought to be regulated or prevented, totally apart
from the residence of the actor or the victim.58
In cases involving true conflicts, interest analysis becomes more
controversial and its adherents disagree about how to proceed.59 Profes-
sor Currie argued for the application of forum law in such cases, and
strongly objected to any balancing of the states' respective policy inter-
ests.60 Other interest analysts have rejected Currie's resolution of true
conflicts and have argued for a weighing of interests61 or even a return
to the territorial rules.62
To apply interest analysis to the attorney-client privilege, it is nec-
essary to reexamine the policies underlying the privilege and to deter-
mine which state or states are interested in applying those policies.
1. Evaluating the Interests
Every state in this country has some form of attorney-client privi-
lege, so it is not useful to speak of the state with the privilege and the
state without the privilege. It is more appropriate to speak of the state
with the stronger privilege and the state with the weaker privilege. The
state with the weaker attorney-client privilege has decided, as a matter
of policy, that the search for truth is promoted by discovery of the par-
ticular communications at issue. The state with the stronger privilege
has decided that it is more important to strengthen the attorney-client
relationship by protecting the particular communications.
The possibly interested states include the forum, the state in which
a deposition of the attorney or client is being taken, the state in which
the attorney practices, the client's state of domicile, the state or states
in which the attorney-client communications took place, the state of
58. Id. at 622.
59. "Interest analysis has lost cohesion and coherence. No longer a single doctrine, it has
become but a loose amalgamation of different approaches that furnish scant guidance to judges
faced with multistate problems." Juenger, supra note 9, at 10.
60. B. CURRIE, supra note 54, at 184; W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 55, at 478.
61. Professor Ehrenzweig wrote in 1966 that "as far as I can see, all courts and writers who
have professed acceptance of Currie's interest language have transformed it by indulging in that
very weighing and balancing of interests from which Currie refrained." Ehrenzweig, A Counter-
Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 377, 389 (1966). A more
recent source agrees. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, § 91, at 268-69.
A notable exception is Professor Sedler, who adheres to Professor Currie's forum-preference rule,
but for somewhat different reasons. See Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of
Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 218-20, 227-33 (1977).
62. See, e.g., Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
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domicile of the other party or parties to the lawsuit, and the state or
states in which the facts giving rise to the underlying cause of action
occurred. In any given case, more than one of these contacts may be
grouped in a single state. For example, the state in which the attorney
practices, the client's state of domicile, and the state in which the com-
munications occurred may often be the same. It is convenient, however,
to analyze each set of interests separately in order to determine exactly
which contact gives the multicontact state a policy interest. Interests
are generally additive, so this separation of the multicontact state's in-
terests is theoretically acceptable.
a. The Interest of the Forum
Most authorities argue that the forum has an interest in applying
its law when it has the weaker privilege. First, it is said that the forum
has an administrative interest in applying its rule because its own law
will be easier to administer and to determine." The problem is that the
forum almost always has such an efficiency-based interest in applying
forum law. A forum court can almost always determine and apply its
own privilege law more easily than it can determine and apply the law
of another state. 4
The second reason frequently given for applying forum law when
its privilege is weaker is the forum's interest in the discovery of truth
and achieving just results.6 However, if the forum has no other policy
interest in the outcome of the case, where does its interest in a just
result come from? Professor Sterk grounds this interest in the effect of
the decision on the reputation of the forum's judicial system,66 but, like
ease of administration, this interest would justify the application of fo-
rum law in all cases.
Scholars frequently argue that the forum has no interest in apply-
63. Sterk, supra note 40, at 475.
64. This will not be true in all choice-of-law problems. For example, if the foreign law
would result in dismissal of the case, the forum's overall administrative burden would be less if the
foreign rule is applied and the case dismissed than if forum law is applied and the case continued.
The attorney-client privilege presents no such exception to the general rule that applying forum
law will be easier.
65. See Reese & Leiwant, Testimonial Privileges and Conflict of Laws, 41 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PRoBs. 85 (Spring 1977); Sterk, supra note 40, at 475-76; Dunham, Testimonial Privileges
in State and Federal Courts: A Suggested Approach, 9 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 26, 38 (1973); Com-
ment, Conflict of Laws and Deposition-Taking, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 297, 299 (1965).
66. See Sterk, supra note 40, at 475-76.
[Vol. 52:909
A TERRITORIAL SOLUTION
ing its law when it has the stronger privilege. 67 Its interest in a just
result does not support a rule which excludes good evidence, and the
forum should not care about the effectiveness of attorneys representing
clients in other states. The ease-of-administration rationale is equally
applicable, however, so arguably the forum has an interest even when
its privilege is stronger.
b. The Interest of the State of Deposition
What if disclosure of the attorney-client communications is sought
not in the state of trial, but in a deposition in another state? What, if
any, separate interests does the deposition state have?
The deposition forum, unlike the trial forum, is merely helping the
parties collect evidence and is not required to reach an ultimate conclu-
sion as to truth or justice. Thus, the interest in a just result is not a
valid rationale for applying the 'deposition state's weaker privilege law.
A court in the deposition state does have the ever-present interest in
ease of administration,68 but such an interest, if recognized, always
works in favor of the law of the court making the choice-of-law deci-
sion. The state of deposition has no other interest in applying its privi-
lege law, whether its law is weaker or stronger. The client or attorney
often will reside in the state where the deposition is taken, which may
give the deposition state an interest, but its interest solely as the place
of the deposition is minimal.
c. The Interest of the State or States in Which the Underlying
Cause of Action Arose
What of the state or states where the actions giving rise to liability
occurred? Does that state, if it has no other connection to the attorney-
client communications, have an interest in applying its privilege? The
answer, surprisingly, is sometimes yes.
Traditional interest analysis rejects territorial analysis, so the state
where the cause of action arose does not automatically have reason to
apply its law. Even interest analysts, however, recognize that a territo-
rially-connected state has an interest in deterring wrongful conduct
within its borders. If deterrence is a viable interest in the particular
case, then the state where the cause of action arose has an interest in
67. See Reese & Leiwant, supra note 65, at 85; Sterk, supra note 40, at 479; Dunham,
supra note 65, at 43-44; Comment, supra note 65, at 299.
68. Sterk, supra note 40, at 496-97.
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having the wrongdoer punished. It therefore wants to see the cause of
action handled effectively and correctly. A strong privilege withholds
evidence and makes effective punishment less likely. If the state where
the cause of action arose has a weaker privilege, it has an interest in
applying its law to make a correct result more likely and to deter the
wrongdoing more effectively.69 The state where the cause of action
arose does not have an interest in applying its law when its privilege is
stronger, however, because it has no interest in less effective
deterrence.
d. The Interest of the Client's Domicile
The state of domicile of the client whose communications with his
attorney are at issue may also have an interest in applying its law, par-
ticularly if the state has a stronger privilege which would protect the
communications. The state has an interest in protecting its domiciliary,
and application of its attorney-client privilege would do so by increas-
ing the quality of legal representation available to the client.
The client's state of domicile has no interest in applying its law
when its privilege law is weaker. Its weaker rule, which would allow
discovery of the communications, does not protect its domiciliary. The
state of domicile might have an interest in promoting broad discovery
to protect the client from an unjust result but not where, by claiming
privilege protection, the client has already shown that he is better pro-
tected by nondisclosure. Since, under traditional interest analysis, the
state of domicile has no interest in making the client worse off, it has
no interest in applying its weaker privilege.
e. The Interest of the Domicile of Other Parties to the Case
Courts and scholars applying interest analysis to privilege ques-
tions often overlook the domicile of the other party to the litigation, the.
party who is seeking discovery of the attorney-client communications.
This is a strange oversight, given the strong interest analysis focus on
domicile. If the other party's domicile has a strong privilege, it clearly
has no interest in applying its law. To do so would disadvantage its
69. See Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdic-
tion, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 535, 537-39 (1956). Weinstein is discussing a situation where the state
whose substantive law applies is also the forum, but he clearly recognizes the relationship between
the ,policy of the substantive law and the protection of the privilege.
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domiciliary and, under traditional interest analysis, the state has no in-
terest in doing that.
It does have an interest in applying its law when its privilege is the
weaker one. It has an interest in protecting its domiciliary from the
possible injustice that might result if the communications are not dis-
closed. The other party's domicile has no particular territorial connec-
tion to the communications, but interest analysis does not require terri-
torial connections and the state has an interest in protecting its own.
f The Interest of the Attorney's State of Practice
The state in which the attorney who communicated with the client
practices is another state that receives short shrift in most interest anal-
ysis discussions. When the state of practice has the weaker privilege, it
probably has no interest in applying its law. The state of practice's in-
terest in promoting and protecting its attorneys is not furthered by a
less protective rule.
The attorney's state of practice may have an interest, however,
when its privilege is the stronger one. A state has an interest in having
effective attorneys, as shown by the general licensing and ethical stan-
dards applied to its bar. If the privilege increases the effectiveness of
legal representation as claimed, the attorney's state of practice may be
interested in applying its law for this reason. Some courts applying a
state of practice rule have analogized the privilege to general ethical
standards affecting attorneys.7 0
This interest, however, falls short in traditional interest analysis.
More effective legal representation has no value in a vacuum; it is de-
sirable because of the benefits it provides clients. Thus, the interest in
effective legal representation really centers on the client, not the attor-
ney. The attorney's state of practice has no interest in applying its
stronger privilege merely because the attorney is there; it has an inter-
est under traditional interest analysis only if the client is also domiciled
there.
g. The Interest of the Situs of the Attorney-Client
Communications
Courts and scholars applying interest analysis to privilege ques-
70. See In re Walsh, 40 Misc. 2d 413, 414, 243 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (1963); In re Franklin
Washington Trust Co., I Misc. 2d 697, 698, 148 N.Y.S.2d 731, 734 (1956); In re Whitlock, 3
N.Y.S. 855, 857 (1889).
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tions often focus on the state or states where the communications oc-
curred. In applying traditional interest analysis, however, the state in
which the attorney-client communications occurred has very little inter-
est in applying its law. When the situs of the communications has the
weaker privilege, it has no real reason to care whose law is applied. 7 1
The chosen privilege rule will not harm or protect its domiciliaries, and
application of some other state's stronger privilege will not influence
conduct within its borders in any negative way. It is also unclear why
the situs of the communications is interested when it has a stronger
attorney-client privilege.7 2 If the attorney and client are just two stran-
gers passing through the state, the situs has no interest in enhancing
their relationship, at least not according to traditional, domicile-based
interest analysis. Application of a stronger privilege rule produces no
desirable in-state consequences. The situs might want its stronger attor-
ney-client privilege rule applied to encourage attorneys and their clients
to travel to the state, but traditional interest analysis seldom recognizes
such promotion-of-business rationales. In any event, it is doubtful that
any state has adopted a stronger attorney-client privilege to promote
tourism, or that the strength of a state's attorney-client privilege has
much of an effect on tourism.
2. Summary of the Interests
The interests of the various states are summarized in the following
chart. A plus sign indicates situations where the state arguably has an
interest in applying its law. A minus sign indicates situations where the
state has no interest under traditional interest analysis. A question
mark has been added in places where the discussion raised doubts
about the interest claimed.
71. Sterk, supra note 40, at 479-80.
72. Most sources simply state without explanation that the state of the communications has
an interest in encouraging such communications within its jurisdiction. See Sterk, supra note 40,
at 475 n.39; Comment, supra note 65, at 300. It is sometimes argued that this is the law the
parties to the communication relied on, see Dunham, supra note 65, at 38, but that argument is
circular. Parties would rely on that law only if the conflicts rules called for its application. The
reliance argument is also factually suspect. If the attorney and the client are from other states,
would they really rely on the law of the state they are passing through?
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STRONGER WEAKER
STATE' PRIVILEGE PRIVILEGE
1. Forum +
2. Deposition +
3. Where Underlying +
4. Communications +(?)
5. Client's Domicile +
6. Attorney's Practice +(?)
7. Other Party's Domicile - +
Cases where there is at least one positive, and all of the applicable
positives fall on the same side of the chart, would be false conflicts.
Where only negatives are present, the situation would be an unpro-
vided-for case. A true conflict would exist if there is at least one posi-
tive on each side of the chart. True conflicts, false conflicts, and unpro-
vided for cases are all possible.
Interest analysts generally agree about how to handle false con-
flicts. Since only one state has a legitimate policy interest in applying
its law, that state's law should apply. Unprovided-for cases are more
difficult, because by definition no state has a legitimate policy interest
in applying its law. For example, consider a case where the forum,
which is also where the underlying cause of action arose and where the
other party to the case resides, has the stronger privilege and the state
of communications, which is also the domicile of the client and the
attorney's state of practice, has the Weaker privilege. Under the con-
ventional analysis, the forum. has no interest in applying its stronger
privilege and the other state has no interest in applying its weaker priv-
ilege. There is no obvious resolution of the problem. Most scholars who
have written on the privilege issue agree, however, that the court
should usually apply the weaker privilege in this case.73 This choice can
73. See Reese & Leiwant, supra note 65, at 93-94; Sterk, supra note 40, at 479-80; Dun-
ham, supra note 65, at 43-44; Weinstein, supra note 69, at 543-44; Comment, supra note 65, at
298-300.
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be justified in two ways, either in terms of a residuary preference for
the law of the forum or in terms of a residuary preference for openness
and full disclosure.
The interest-based approaches present two major problems. One is
the difficulty in identifying which states have an interest in applying
their law to any given case. As shown above, whether a state has a
legitimate interest is often debatable. In fact, the whole "interest" con-
cept is questionable. The second problem with interest-based ap-
proaches arises in the true conflict setting. Consider a case where the
forum has the weaker privilege and other interested states (the state of
communications, the state of the client's domicile, and the attorney's
state of practice) 74 have the stronger privilege. This case presents a
true conflict under conventional analysis. The forum has an interest in
the discovery of truth and achieving just results. The other state has an
interest in protecting the communications to promote the attorney-cli-
ent relationship.
In this situation, the scholars are hopelessly split. Although Profes-
sor Currie never specifically considered the attorney-client privilege, his
general fall-back rule for true conflicts is to apply forum law. 5 One
student comment agrees with this resolution of true conflicts for privi-
leges. 6 Professors Reese and Leiwant would "frequently" apply forum
law in such cases, but argue that the court should make "the best ac-
commodation that it can between the conflicting interests of the two
states. 17  They argue that the court must weigh the need for the evi-
dence, the parties' reliance on the privilege, and the extent of the con-
tacts between the case and the forum.7 8 The more important the evi-
dence, the lesser the reliance interest, and the greater the forum
contacts, the more willing the trial court should be to apply its own
privilege law.
On the other hand, Professors Sterk and Dunham would generally
apply the stronger privilege law of the non-forum state. Professor Sterk
74. Many scholars circumvent the problem of determining the most interested state or the
state with the most significant relationship to the communications by assuming that an unspecified
state is the most interested and then posing the problem as a choice between the law of that
unspecified state and the law of the forum. See Sterk, supra note 40, at 475, 479-95; Dunham,
supra note 65, at 36-53; Comment, A Choice of Law Analysis of Evidentiary Privileges, 50 LA. L.
REV. 157, 172-75 (1989).
75. B. CURRIE, supra note 54, at 184.'
76. Comment, supra note 65, at 301.
77. Reese & Leiwant, supra note 65, at 104.
78. Id. at 95-97.
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would always apply the other state's law based on his conclusion that
the other state's "interests are clearly stronger."17 9 Professor Dunham
would generally apply the law of the other interested state, with three
exceptions:
First, where a plaintiff seeks redress in the forum's court system and attempts to
invoke a foreign privilege. Second, where the privilege of one state is helpful to
the communicators in perpetrating a harm on the citizens and policies of another
state. Third, where the testimony is of little relevance or can be obtained from
another source. 80
Professor Weinstein's unique resolution focuses on the substantive law
applicable to the underlying case. If the forum will be applying its own
substantive law, Weinstein believes forum privilege law should also ap-
ply."' If the substantive law of another interested state applies, Wein-
stein believes that its privilege law should apply as well.85
As this shows, interest analysis is difficult to analyze, because in
the hardest cases, those where there are true conflicts, it disintegrates
into a number of possible approaches.8 3 The cases purporting to apply
interest analysis to choice-of-law problems involving the attorney-client
privilege8 4 reflect this confusion. These cases demonstrate a surprising
territoriality and a surprising lack of concrete analysis. Almost without
exception, they merely recite a string of territorial contacts with the
state whose law the court decides to apply and without further discus-
sion conclude that state has a superior interest."5
79. Sterk, supra note 40, at 487.
80. Dunham, supra note 65, at 53.
81. Weinstein, supra note 69, at 537-39.
82. Id. at 539-43.
83. See supra note 9.
84. See ICI Ams. Inc. v. John Wanamaker, 1989 W.L. 38647 (E.D. Pa.); McNulty v.
Bally's Park Place, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Command Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line
(USA) Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987); Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Technologies,
Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1987); Emejota Eng'g Corp. v. Kent Polymers Inc., 1985 W.L.
4019 (E.D. Pa.); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Bandag Inc., 562 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
85. Command Transp.. Inc., 116 F.R.D. 94, in which the U.S. District Court purported to
apply Massachusetts' interest analysis rules, is typical. The court's full discussion of the choice-of-
law issue follows:
In this tort action, the plaintiff is a Massachusetts corporation, the defendant does business
in Massachusetts, and the bulk of the acts forming the basis of plaintiffs complaint oc-
curred in Massachusetts as well as the alleged injury. Accordingly, under Massachusetts
choice of law rules, Massachusetts substantive law should provide the rule of decision re-
garding whether the Estis' communications with Attorney Greenwood are privileged.
116 F.R.D. at 95. The court doesn't explain Massachusetts' governmental interest or indicate why
Massachusetts' interest is superior to the possible interests of other states. The court's discussion
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Even cases which initially seem analytical fall apart on close ex-
amination. Connolly Data Systems, Inc. v. Victor Technologies, Inc.,86
illustrates this point nicely. The plaintiff, Connolly Data Systems, was
a New Hampshire corporation headquartered in Massachusetts. The
defendant, Victor Technologies, was incorporated and headquartered in
California. Each party claimed that the other breached a distributor-
ship agreement allowing Connolly to market and distribute a desktop
computer manufactured by Victor. The lawsuit was filed in federal dis-
trict court in Massachusetts. Thereafter, Victor's Massachusetts attor-
ney had conversations, on the telephone and in California, with Han-
son, Victor's former treasurer. At a deposition in California, Hanson
refused to answer questions about these conversations.
The California court purported to apply interest analysis to deter-
mine whether to apply Massachusetts or California privilege law. The
court began by noting that Victor, the party asserting the privilege, was
a California corporation with its principal place of business in Califor-
nia. According to the court, "The state of domicile of the corporation
asserting the attorney-client privilege is an important factor to consider
in choosing the law that governs the scope of that privilege. ' 87 The
court did not explain why that connection gave California an interest in
applying its law.88
The court then noted that the communications took place "primar-
ily" in California and that any expectation of confidentiality the parties
had "would likely stem from the laws in the state in which he resided
and from which he spoke." 8 This second reason is stronger, but leaves
several questions unanswered. First, why does this expectation of confi-
dentiality give California a governmental policy interest in applying its
law? Under traditional interest analysis, California might have an in-
terest in applying its privilege to protect the California client, but not
in this case because the court ultimately decides that California law
does not protect the conversations.90 Second, even if California has an
does not even allow one to identify other potentially interested states. For example, what is the
defendant's state of incorporation and why is that not relevant? Cf. Note, supra note 56 (arguing
that interest analysis does not (and cannot) deal well with corporations). This conclusory analysis
is typical of the cases applying interest analysis to the attorney-client privilege.
86. 114 F.R.D. 89.
87. Id. at 91.
88. The court cites Super Tire Eng'g Co., 562 F. Supp. at 440, but that case also reaches
this conclusion summarily without explanation.
89. Connolly, 114 F.R.D. at 92.
90. Id. at 93-96.
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interest, why does Massachusetts not also have an interest given that
its resident was the other party to the conversation and spoke in at least
one instance (the telephone conversation) from Massachusetts? Finally,
this portion of the argument is circular. Hanson and the attorney could
have a justified expectation of confidentiality stemming from California
law only if they knew the court would apply California law. If the con-
flicts rule applied the law of the attorney's domicile, any justified ex-
pectation of confidentiality would stem from Massachusetts law.
Not satisfied to stop there, the court pointed out that Hanson's
deposition was taken in California. The court noted that "[u]nder such
circumstances, federal courts have applied the privilege law of the fo-
rum where the deposition took place." 91 Again, the court did not ex-
plain why the location of the deposition gave California an interest in
applying its law.
Finally, without discussion, the court concluded that Massachu-
setts had no interest and therefore a false conflict existed. 92 The closest
the court came to examining the possible interests of Massachusetts
was a conclusory statement that "[t]he fact that the underlying litiga-
tion is pending in Massachusetts is not controlling."93
None of the other cases applying interest analysis to the attorney-
client privilege fare any better than Connolly.9 All are intellectually
vacuous-the court slaps the interest analysis label on a conclusion and
is done with it.95
Often the interest analysis cases apply the law of the state of com-
munications, which is usually the domicile of the client.96 Some cases,
however, never mention in their choice-of-law analysis where the com-
munications occurred. 97 Other cases mention that the communications
91. Id. at 92. Curiously, the one case the court cites, Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp.
871 (E.D. Mich. 1982), is not an interest analysis case at all. Wright applies the privilege law of
the state of deposition without any choice-of-law analysis. 547 F. Supp. at 874-75.
92. 114 F.R.D. at 92.
93. id.
94. See supra note 84.
95. One person who read an earlier draft of this Article pointed out that this is probably an
overly harsh criticism of the courts because scholars who try to identify the relevant interests often
do little better.
96. See McNulty v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Command
Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line (USA) Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987); Connolly Data Sys., Inc.
v. Victor Technologies, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1987); Emejota Eng'g Corp. v. Kent
Polymers Inc., 1985 W.L. 4019 (E.D. Pa.).
97. See Command Transp., Inc., 116 F.R.D. at 94, 95 (factual discussion indicates that the
communication occurred in Massachusetts, but this is not listed as one of the reasons for applying
Massachusetts law). See also Super Tire Eng'g Co., 562 F. Supp. at 440 (court says that the
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occurred in the state whose law is being applied, but list other connec-
tions to that state and do not say which contacts are important or
why.98 In some cases it is unclear what the court is relying on. 99 One
court uses interest analysis to treat the privilege as a rule of evidence
governed by the law of the forum.'00 In sum, the cases applying interest
analysis to the attorney-client privilege are unclear at best and con-
fused or manipulative at worst.
D. The "Most Significant Relationship" Test
Another modern approach to choice-of-law is the "most significant
relationship" test used in the Second Restatement. For many legal is-
sues, the Second Restatement applies the law of the state with the
"most significant relationship" to the issue.1 1 The Second Restatement
does not apply a simple most significant relationship test to privi-
leges, 02 but since some courts have done so, this Article examines'0 3
the "most significant relationship" test in the context of the attorney-
client privilege.'04
attorney-client relationship "arose in Iowa, the state of Bandag's corporate headquarters," but
does not say whether this means that the communications occurred there).
98. See McNulty, 120 F.R.D. at 31; Connolly Data Sys., Inc., 114 F.R.D. at 91-92;
Emejota Eng'g Corp., 1985 W.L. 4019.
99. See ICI Ams. Inc. v. John Wanamaker, 1989 W.L. 38647 (E.D. Pa.) ("the scope of
attorney-client privilege is collateral to the contract and concerns issues of discovery, evidence,
and privilege more associated with Pennsylvania civil practice than California contract law").
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969) (tort liabil-
ity); id. § 188 (contract liability).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 129-42.
103. See infra notes 124-25.
104. A preliminary issue to be resolved is whether, in applying the most significant relation-
ship test or any other interest-based test, a court should look to the state with the most significant
relationship to the privileged communications or the state with the most significant relationship to
the underlying cause of action. The Second Restatement opts for the former, looking to the state
which has the most significant relationship with the privileged communications. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 comment e (1969). This is consistent with the modern
acceptance of d~peqage, the process of applying conflicts rules on an issue-by-issue basis. See
generally Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 CoLuM. L. REv. 58
(1973). At least one court, however, has applied the privilege law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the underlying cause of action. In Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co.,
455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972), the plaintiff alleged that earlier litigation by the defendant to avoid
a Mississippi judgment constituted abuse of process. The plaintiff sought to compel the defendant
to produce a number of documents which the.defendant claimed were protected by the attorney-
client privilege. Since the action was a diversity case brought in Mississippi, the court looked to
Mississippi's choice-of-law rules. Id. at 340. Mississippi had recently adopted a "center of gravity"
choice of law test and the court decided that, under that test, Mississippi had the most substantial
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The Second Restatement does not define "most significant rela-
tionship," but it does list factors a court should consider in making that
determination.10 5 These are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.'"
The first factor, the needs of the interstate and international sys-
tems, is unlikely to be determinative."07 The comments discussing this
factor stress two themes, harmony and uniformity. First, according to
the comment, choice-of-law rules "should seek to further harmonious
relations between states and to facilitate commercial intercourse be-
tween them."' 108 Second, states should choose rules that are likely to be
adopted by other states as well, leading to greater certainty, predict-
ability, and uniformity. Neither of these policies favors the attorney-
client privilege of any particular state. These policies, however, do
favor an easily applicable, predictable rule so that different states using
contacts with the alleged tort. Id. at 341. Without discussing which state had the most substantial
contacts with the communications, the court continued: "For purposes of this litigation we also
believe that Mississippi would treat the attorney-client privilege as a substantive matter. It follows
that the court would thus use the center of gravity test and apply Mississippi law to any such
claim of privilege." Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit assumed without discussion that the law governing
the cause of action would govern the privilege claim as well. See also supra text accompanying
notes 80-81.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969). Particular sections
also list particular contacts to be considered in applying those general principles. For example,
§ 145 instructs a court in tort cases to consider the place where the injury occurred; the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incor-
poration and place of business of the parties; and the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2). See also id.
§ 188(2) (contacts to consider in contract cases). Section 145 indicates that these contacts should
"be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue." Id.
§ 145(2). The precise relationship between these specifically listed contacts and the general prin-
ciples in § 6 is unclear.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1969). The comments to § 6
indicate that the list of factors is not exclusive and that a court might occasionally consider other,
unspecified factors. Id. § 6 comment c. The possibility of other considerations makes this ap-
proach even more murky than the text that follows indicates.
107. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L. REV.
501, 509 (1983).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment d (1969).
1991]
934 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
the same test will reach the same result. An easily applicable rule also
promotes harmonious relations between the states. If the choice is
clear, other states will be less suspicious that, in the guise of weighing
or balancing interests, the forum is actually motivated by politics or a
naked preference for forum law. Beyond that, the first factor provides
little guidance.
Factors two and three of section 6 of the Second Restatement look
to the relevant policies of the forum and other interested states, and the
relative interests of the other interested states in the determination of
the particular issue. This sounds like interest analysis and the com-
ments support that conclusion. The comments suggest a focus on the
purposes of each state's rule1"9 and indicate that one should ."appraise
the relative interests of the states involved in the determination of the
particular issue. '"" ' A forum should not apply its own rule solely be-
cause it is the forum, but only if the purposes sought to be achieved by
the local rule would be served by its application to out-of-state facts."'
According to the comments, a court should generally apply the law of
"the state whose interests are most deeply affected." 1 2 This tracks in-
terest analysis fairly closely;11 3 therefore, the discussion of interest
analysis applies here as well.""
The fourth factor to be considered is the protection of justified ex-
pectations. The comment notes that "it would be unfair and improper
to hold a person liable under [the] local law of one state when he had
justifiably molded his conduct to conform to the requirements of an-
other state.""' The justified expectations argument is circular; in a
multistate transaction, an expectation that a particular state's law will
apply is justified only if the conflicts rules call for application of that
state's law. An attorney could justifiably. assume that his own state's
law would protect communications with his client only if that were the
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comments e, f (1969).
110. Id. § 6 comment f.
Ill. Id. § 6 comment e. The comment recognizes the interest of the forum qua forum in
applying its rules relating to trial administration. Id.
112. Id. § 6 comment f.
113. See Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064, 1084 (E.D. Pa.
1977), rev d, 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978) (The analysis required by these two factors is "virtu-
ally indistinguishable from Professor Currie's interest analysis."). But see Reppy, supra note 3, at
655-62 (arguing that the crux of the Second Restatement methodology is center of gravity territo-
rialism, but conceding that the comments discussing these two factors sound like interest
analysis).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 63-100.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment g (1969).
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existing conflicts rule.11 But the whole purpose of the justified expecta-
tions argument is to help a court choose the conflicts rule. This logical
fallacy can be avoided by reading justified expectations as synonymous
with predictability or foreseeability. When the attorney and client con-
ferred, which state's laws would predictably apply? The parties would
be justified in relying on predictably applicable laws to the exclusion of
others, but this would not help a court choose among the privileges of
more than one predictable state. When attorney and client confer, they
could foresee that the privileges of the attorney's domicile, the client's
domicile, and the state of the communication might apply. In many
circumstances, they would also be aware of the state where the under-
lying transaction occurred or was to occur, and might foresee the appli-
cation of its law. But the fourth factor would not support the applica-
tion of the law of a naked forum, a state with no other connection to
the dispute or the communications. In most cases, the attorney and cli-
ent cannot predict what the eventual forum will be.
Section 6 next directs an examination of thebasic policies underly-
ing the particular field of law. The comment expands on this
consideration:
This factor is of particular importance in situations where the policies of the
interested states are largely the same but where there are nevertheless minor
differences between their relevant local law rules. In such instances, there is good
reason for the court to apply the local law of. that state which will best achieve
the basic policy, or policies, underlying the particular field of law involved. 1"
Read, this way, the fifth factor is similar to the "comparative im-
pairment" approach advocated by Professor Baxter.118 Although states'
particular laws might differ, they often share common policies; a court
should apply the rule which best furthers the shared policies.
At a basic level, states with a narrow attorney-client privilege and
states with a broader attorney-client privilege have common policy con-
cerns. Each is interested in the discovery of truth and the proper appli-
cation of law. The specific rules adopted to achieve those broad goals
differ. The state with the narrow privilege believes that those policies
are best served by the free discovery and admissibility of the particular
116. The client's expectations might be more naive, but the client is unlikely to have more
than a vague, generalized expectation of confidentiality. See infra text accompanying notes 172-
73. The client is unlikely to be relying on the law of any particular state or even know the details
of the attorney-client privilege of any particular state.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment h (1969).
118. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. I, 4-22 (1963).
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attorney-client communications before the court. The state with the
stronger privilege has the same goal, but pursues that goal differently.
It believes that the freer communications and enhanced legal represen-
tation resulting from the broader privilege will further the search for
truth more than will the open discovery favored by the state with the
weaker privilege.
The two states thus disagree about the balance between effective
representation and availability of evidence which is most likely to pro-
duce justice, with justice being defined as proper application of the law.
They also may disagree about the causal connection between confiden-
tiality and effective representation in the individual case. A court has
no way to determine which local law better serves the common policy
other than to make its own, independent policy decision. This is not
legitimate choice of law, but merely the substitution of a third view of
better policy-the forum court's-for that of the two states. " 9 There is
no reason to accord the forum court's policy view any special deference,
or to treat it as superior to that of either of the states. Thus, the fifth
Second Restatement factor, where it makes a difference, evaporates
into judicial fiat.
The sixth factor-certainty, predictability, and uniformity-is
somewhat incompatible with the most significant relationship test and
the entire Second Restatement approach. An uncertain, multifactor
balancing test hardly seems likely to promote certainty or predictability
and the latitude given judges is unlikely to produce uniformity. Not
surprisingly, the comments minimize this consideration's importance.
"These values," the comment states, "can . . . be purchased at too
great a price. In a rapidly developing area, such as choice of law, it is
often more important that good rules be developed than that predict-
ability and uniformity of result should be assured through continued
adherence to existing rules."120
Predictability requires a conflicts rule the results of which the par-
ties can know in advance. The balancing and policy analysis inherent in
most of the modern approaches are not easily predictable. Courts ap-
plying these tests to the attorney-client privilege can and have differed
in their choice of law; attorney and client are thus unable to predict at
the time of the communication which state's privilege a court will even-
tually choose. A forum law rule like that of the First Restatement
119. For a convincing rejection of the "shared policy" method of analysis, see Ely, supra
note 56, at 201-203.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment i (1969).
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presents similar problems; the conferring attorney and client usually
cannot predict which state will be the forum. Thus, none of the existing
rules is predictable.
Uniformity is also unlikely under any multifactor balancing test. A
concern for uniformity again supports a definite rule, and again a law-
of-the-forum rule is unacceptable. If each forum applies its own law,
identical cases are treated differently depending on where the lawsuit is
filed. In addition to producing disuniformity, this encourages forum-
shopping by plaintiffs who anticipate an attorney-client privilege
issue.,"
The meaning of "certainty" is unclear, but the desire for "cer-
tainty" appears to add little to the analysis. If this means certainty at
the time of the conduct-when attorney and client communicate-then
everything said concerning predictability applies equally to certainty. If
this means certainty at the time of decision, then this is merely another
label for the final factor, ease in the determination and application of
the law to be applied, and, as argued below, a law of the forum ap-
proach is preferable.
The final section 6 consideration is ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied. This consideration almost always
favors forum law. A forum-preference rule makes the court's decision
easy, unlike choice-of-law rules which require the identification and
balancing of state interests. And what law is easier to locate and apply
than the forum's own local law? If this consideration were determina-
tive, the forum's attorney-client privilege would always be applied. The
comments, however, minimize the importance of this factor; 2 it is at
best something to be considered if a weighing of the other factors pro-
duces no definitive result.
There is something for everyone in the Second Restatement's
seven factors. Depending on the weight given to each factor, the most
significant relationship test could be used to justify the application of
almost any state's attorney-client privilege. The cases do not ade-
quately reflect this ambiguity, however, because, for the most part, the
121. It is not clear how often plaintiffs could anticipate a claim of attorney-client privilege.
This is most likely in lawsuits against corporations, especially where the plaintiff is aware of an
internal corporate investigation of the transaction at issue. Even if the plaintiff could anticipate a
claim of attorney-client privilege, numerous other considerations affect the choice of forum, and
differing attorney-client privileges might not strongly affect the choice.
122. "This policy should not be overemphasized, since it is obviously of greater importance
that choice-of-law rules lead to desirable results." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6 comment j (1969).
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few cases purporting to apply the most significant relationship test, or
the related center of gravity test,1 28 to the attorney-client privilege have
not involved difficult facts.1 24 The few cases involving tough choices are
as conclusory as the interest analysis cases.125
The comments to the Second Restatement indicate that the state
where the communication took place will usually have the most signifi-
cant relationship with a privileged communication.1 28 However, a domi-
cile-based analysis is introduced where there is a prior relationship be-
tween the parties to the communication, as there often will be between
attorney and client. "If there was such a prior relationship between the
parties, the state of most significant relationship will be that state
where the relationship was centered unless the state where the commu-
nication took place has substantial contacts with the parties and the
transaction.' 27 Thus, if both attorney and client are domiciled in State
X but confer while on a brief vacation in State Y, the privilege law of
123. Professor Reppy argues that "[t]he crux of the Restatement Second's methodology is
center of gravity territorialism," except that the Second Restatement seeks to determine center of
gravity on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than determining a single center of gravity for the entire
cause of action. Reppy, supra note 3, at 655.
124.- Brandman v. Cross & Brown Co., Inc., 125 Misc. 2d 185, 479 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1984), is
typical. In Brandman, the attorney was a New York attorney, the client was a company located in
New York, the attorney-client communications occurred in New York, and New York was the
forum. The court easily decided to apply New York law. Brandman, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 437. See
also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 47 (W.D. Pa.
1977).
125. One of the few "most significant relationship" cases involving a tough choice is
Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982). Renfield brought an
antitrust action against E. Remy Martin & Co., a French company, and its American affiliate,
Remy Amerique. Renfield sought documents relating to communications between officials of both
defendants and employees of the French company identified as in-house counsel. Some of those
documents were in France and some were in the United States. The Renfield court assumed that
the documents were not privileged under French law, but held that they were privileged under
U.S. law. 98 F.R.D. at 444. As to documents located in France, the court held that the Hague
Evidence Convention allowed the witness to assert a privilege if either state recognized it. 98
F.R.D. at 443-44. The court held, however, that the Hague Convention did not apply to docu-
ments located in the United States. With respect to the documents located in the United States,
the court held that the United States had the most significant relationship with the communica-
tions. The court's analysis was brief, compacted into one sentence: "The officials located in the
New York office of Remy Amerique are the ones who sought the legal advice and the United
States has the same interest in protecting the.freedom of these individuals to obtain legal advice as
it does for any other American residents." 98 F.R.D. at 445.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 comment e (1969). Accord
Reese & Leiwant, supra note 65, at 93; Dunham, supra note 65, at 42.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 comment e (1969). Accord
Reese & Leiwant, supra note 65, at 93.
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State X will probably apply. 28 If their contacts with State Y are less
ephemeral, the result is indeterminate.
E. Section 139 of the Second Restatement
The-Second Restatement does not apply an unadorned "most sig-
nificant relationship" test to privileges. The Second Restatement re-
tains the First Restatement's rules that questions of witnesses' compe-
tence and the admissibility of evidence are determined by forum law, 129
but adds a section dealing specifically with privileges.'"0 Section 139,
the privilege section, uses the "most significant relationship" test, but
not exclusiyely. Instead, a court following section 139 almost always
applies the law that rejects the attorney-client privilege. Section 139(1)
provides that if evidence is privileged under forum law, but not under
the law of the state with the most significant relationshipwith the com-
munication, it will be admitted unless its admission would violate a
strong public policy of the forum.'' Under section 139(2), if evidence
is not privileged under forum law, but is privileged under the law of the
state with the most significant relationship, it will also be admitted,
"unless there is some special reason why the forum policy favoring ad-
mission should not be given effect."' 32 Thus, unless one of the excep-
tions applies, section 139 always chooses the weaker privilege.
It is unclear what the "strong public policy" exception to section
139(1) means. Apparently, if the forum is really serious about its attor-
ney-client privilege and willing to use the public policy exception liber-
ally, it can always apply its own law. So used, section 139 reverts to the
First Restatement "law of the forum" approach. The comments to sec-
128. This example is based on the following example in comment (e):
[if a husband and wife are domiciled in state X and the wife makes a statement to the
husband in state Y while the spouses are spending a weekend in the latter state, X is the
state which has the most significant relationship with the communication. Y, on the other
hand, might be the state of most significant relationship if the spouses spent a considerable
portion of their time there.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 comment e (1969).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 137, 138 (1969).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1969). Curiously, § 139
and the comments to § 139 are phrased in terms of the admissibility of evidence concerning the
communications, rather than discoverability. It is not clear why the drafters used this language.
That the drafters meant for § 139 to cover discoverability as well as admissibility at trial is clear.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 comment f (1988 rev.). Comment (f)
discusses the choice of law problem when depositions are taken in a. state other than the trial
forum state. Id.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1969).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(2) (1969).
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tion 139, however, indicate that the public policy exception should be
applied only in "rare" instances.133 The comment notes that the forum
may want to use this exception "occasionally" when, even though it
does not have the most significant relationship with the communication,
it "does have a substantial relationship to the parties and the transac-
tion and a real interest in the outcome of the case."1 4 The comment
does not explain why the forum's "substantial relationship" and real
interest in the case's outcome outweighs the other state's greater "most
significant relationship" and real interest in the case's outcome. Appar-
ently, forum preference is acceptable if the forum has a strong connec-
tion to the facts. The forum preference is even more blatant in the
following sentence of the comment, which states that, "[o]n still rarer
occasions, the state of the forum might consider a given privilege, as
that of priest and penitent, sacrosanct and therefore not permit intro-
duction of the evidence even though the state of the forum has no rela-
tionship to the transaction . ..." This expressly approves reversion
to a pure law-of-the-forum rule-if a state feels strongly enough about
the attorney-client relationship, it can always apply its own privilege.
The exception to section 139(2) is also unclear. The comment indi-
cates that, in deciding whether to apply the privilege of the state that
has the most significant relationship with the privilege, the forum
should consider "(1) the number and nature of the contacts that the
state of the forum has with the parties and the transaction involved, (2)
the relative materiality of the evidence that is sought to be excluded,
(3) the kind of privilege involved and (4) fairness to the parties.' 3 a6
According to the comments, a forum should be more inclined to apply
the foreign privilege in a section 139(2) case if the forum's contacts to
the issue are insignificant or the evidence is unlikely to affect the
case, 1 7 if the privilege is well established and recognized in many
states rather than a relatively novel one,' 38 or if the parties to the com-
munication have relied on the privilege.' 39 Finally, "[t]he forum will
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 comment c (1969).
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 comment d (1969).
137. Id.
138. Id. This sounds a lot like the "better law" approach accepted by some authorities. See
infra text accompanying notes 145-52.
139. RESTATEMENT (LEAD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 Comment e (1969).
Such reliance may be found if at the time of the communication the parties were aware of
the existence of the privilege in the local law of the state of most significant relationship.
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take such steps as may be necessary to prevent a party to the action
from taking an inequitable advantage of the privilege. ' 14 0 Thus, al-
though section 139(2) begins as a rule of forum preference, the excep-
tion makes it a balancing test that allows the judge broad discretion.
Section 139 has not been widely adopted. The only attorney-client
privilege case which expressly followed the section is Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 4' a 1980 Illinois decision. Consolidation
Coal used section 139(2) to apply forum law even though the court
held that another state had the most significant relationship to the
communications.1 42
F. Professor Leflar's Principles and the "Better" Law Approach
Professor Leflar has proposed five choice-influencing considerations
for choice-of-law decisions.' 4 s Those considerations are (1) predictabil-
ity of results, (2) maintenance of the interstate and international order,
(3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's
governmental interests, and (5) application of the better rule of law.144
With the exception of the last consideration, Leflar's principles corre-
Such reliance may also be found if the parties, although unaware of the existence of the
privilege, made the communication in reliance on the fact that communications of the sort
involved are treated in strict confidence in the state of the most significant relationship. In
this latter situation, the fact that the communication was of a sort treated in strict confi-
dence in the state of most significant relationship was presumably a result of the existence
of the privilege. Hence, in a real sense the parties could be said to have relied upon the
privilege although ignorant of it.
Id.
140. Id.
141. 93 Ill. App. 3d 35, 416 N.E.2d 1090 (1980), vacated, 89 IlI. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250
(1982).
142. The defendant in that case was headquartered in Wisconsin and its principal place of
business was in Wisconsin. The plaintiff sought to discover notes taken by the defendant's in-house
counsel of interviews in Wisconsin with the defendant's employees. Wisconsin's attorney-client
privilege protected these notes, but Illinois's did not. The court concluded that Wisconsin had the
most significant relationship to the privilege questions because the communications were in Wis-
consin. Consolidation Coal, 416 N.E.2d at 1094. However, citing § 139(2), the court applied
Illinois law. "We have reviewed the countervailing considerations in favor of Wisconsin's policy
S. . ," the court wrote, "and have determined that they do not outweigh the Illinois policy favor-
ing discoverability." Id.
143. See generally Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 267 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations]; Leflar, Conflicts Law:
More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar,
Conflicts Law].
144. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 143, at 282; see also Leflar,
Conflicts Law, supra note 143, at 1586-88. For a general discussion of these five factors, see R.
LEFLAR, L. McDoUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, at 290-300.
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spond fairly closely to the principles of section 6 of the Second Restate-
ment, and the analysis of the Second Restatement principles would ap-
ply.145 Leflar's unique contribution is the "better law" principle.
According to Leflar, "[s]uperiority of one rule of law over another, in
terms of socioeconomic jurisprudential standards, is far from being the
whole basis for choice of law, but ,it is one of the relevant considera-
tions."14' 6 Leflar's "better law" consideration has been used surprisingly
often by the courts." 7
Unfortunately, Leflar proposes no objective standard for determin-
ing which law is "better," and it is impossible to conceive of such a
standard. How is one to say that the attorney-client privilege of State
A is objectively "better" than the attorney-client privilege of State B?
Obviously, State B does not think so or it would adopt State A's rule." 8
The "better law" consideration is likely to be merely another justifica-
tion for applying forum law. " 9 Leflar concedes that a court is likely to
determine that its own law is better,1 51 but argues that forum law is not
the inevitable result of the "better law" approach. 5 1 However, Profes-
sor Reppy in 1983 was able to find only three reported cases where the
substantive law of another state was held to be better than forum
law.15 In any event, the "better law" approach, even more than the
other modern approaches, gives a court unfettered discretion to choose
the applicable privilege.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 101-128.
146. R. LEFLAR. L. McDoUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, at 297.
147. See Kay, supra note 1, at 571.
148. Professor Weintraub suggested that the "better law" approach should be applied only
where the other state's law is anachronistic or aberrational. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 343 (3d ed. 1986). A rule is anachronistic as he uses the term if "over recent
time, many states with the rule have abandoned it and none or very few have adopted it." Id. at
289. A rule is aberrational if "adopted by one or very few states and sufficient time has passed to
make it clear that more states are unlikely to adopt the rule." Id. at 290. Apart from other
possible objections to this standard, it is unlikely to assist in deciding attorney-client privilege
questions. Few of the cases involving conflicts in the scope of the attorney-client privilege involve
rules that could be termed anachronistic or aberrational. Under Weintraub's revision, the "better
law" consideration is not relevant to the inquiry of this Article.
149. On first approach, and often on exams as well, some of my conflicts students equate
"better law" with recovery for the plaintiff.
150. "It is evident that the search for the better rule of law may lead a court almost auto-
matically to its own lawbooks." Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 143, at 298.
151. "A court sufficiently aware of the relation between law and societal needs to recognize
superiority of one rule over another need not be restrained in its choice by the fact that the
outmoded rule happens still to prevail in its own state." R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX,
supra note 2, at 299.
152. Reppy, supra note 3, at 674 n.139.
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IV. THE NEED FOR CERTAINTY -AND PREDICTABILITY: A RETURN
TO TERRITORIALISM
A basic problem with all of the existing choice-of-law tests as ap-
plied to the attorney-client privilege is that they are unpredictable. The
attorney-client privilege will encourage communications between attor-
ney and client only if both parties know at the time of their communi-
cations whether the privilege will apply.1" If they are uncertain, their
communications will be chilled, and the purpose of the privilege will be
entirely defeated. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
[If the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all.18'
Outside the conflicts setting, courts rarely try to engage in case-
by-case balancing to determine the scope of the privilege. 155 Opinions
recognize that certainty and predictability are needed if the privilege is
to serve its purpose. '5  The refusal to balance in individual cases rests
on a rule-utilitarian view that departures from the privilege in individ-
ual cases might seem just, but the resulting uncertainty' would destroy
the value of the privilege for all attorney-client communications. 157 As
153. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context,
28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473, 483 (1987); Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 482-83 (1982); Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 308-09 (1977);
Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 424, 426 (1970); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); In re Von Bulow,
828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cit. 1987); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cit.
1979).
154. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 393.
155. Note, supra note 33, at 468-69.
156. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 393; In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d at
100; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1235.
157. Sexton, supra note 153, at 483; Note, supra note 33, at 469. The Note disagrees with
this argument and contends that a balancing test would not seriously affect attorney-client com-
munications. Id. at 469-73. The assumptions underlying this position are heroic to say the least.
The author begins by arguing that clients will disclose information to their attorneys no matter
how vague the standard "because there is no ready substitute for legal advice and, perhaps, be-
cause they realize that the costs of withholding information from their legal representatives are
likely to outweigh the consequences which might result from any compelled disclosure of confiden-
tial communications." Id. at 470-71. This, of course, is an outright rejection of the rationale un-
derlying the attorney-client privilege. If true, it justifies not only a vague, ad hoc test, but a com-
plete rejection of the attorney-client privilege. If one accepts the privilege and its rationale, one
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one commentator has argued, "An ad hoc approach to privilege pursu-
ant to a vague standard achieves the worst of possible worlds: harm in
the particular case because information may be concealed; and a lack
of compensating long-range benefit because persisting uncertainty
about the availability of the privilege will discourage some
communications." 18
For some reason, the choice-of-law cases involving the attorney-
client privilege 159 have never focused on the need for certainty and pre-
dictability, even though the modern approaches recognize the value of
certainty and predictability in other substantive areas, such as mar-
must find another argument to justify an ad hoc balancing standard.
The author next argues that the privilege is already marred by "vague and open-textured
criteria" and therefore any additional uncertainty added by a balancing test will be inconsequen-
tial. Id. at 471-72. He gives as examples of the existing uncertainty the difficulty in distinguishing
between "legal" and "business" advice and uncertainty as to whether the privilege extends to all
communications or only to those which disclose a fact mentioned by the client in confidence.
These examples are unconvincing. The cases cited to support them seem relatively easy to follow.
In few cases will an attorney be unable to advise a client as to the lines drawn. More importantly,
even if the existing rules are properly characterized as "vague" in certain areas, the Note does not
explain why substituting an ad hoc approach to define all privilege law would be inconsequential.
Some uncertainty does not justify absolute uncertainty.
Finally, the Note argues that "countless decisions" made every day are subject to uncertain
legal standards and that if courts articulate the factors going into their decisions, the loss of
certainty will be minimized. Id. at 472. The author is correct that the law often uses vague stan-
dards like "reasonableness," but he is wrong that this justifies vague standards generally. In some
cases, if uncertainty is a problem, the parties can avoid that uncertainty by specifying a contrac-
tual alternative. In other cases, certainty and predictability are not essential. And, in some cases,
the uncertainty resulting from ambiguous, ad hoc legal standards produces dead-weight losses to
the parties. In applying a rigid standard to the attorney-client privilege, courts have rightly deter-
mined that the need for certainty and predictability places the privilege in the last category.
The Note's conclusion that uncertainty can be minimized by the courts' articulation of fac-
tors informing their decisions places unjustified faith in judicial honesty and competence. As the
discussions of interest analysis and the other modern approaches shows, the articulated factors of
decision provide little concrete guidance. If anything, they enhance the uncertainty. In short, the
Note provides little support for a departure from the approach to the attorney-client privilege that
has worked reasonably well for decades.
158. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, supra
note 153, at 426. See also Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Share-
holder Litigation, supra note 153, at 308:
Although a more flexible approach, where the magnitude of the harm of suppression might
be considered in each case, would have the advantage of minimizing the suppression of
evidence, this needed element of certainty logically requires a privilege against disclosure
governed by a standard rule and not by ad hoc determinations.
159. An exception is Comment, Discovery in Complex Litigation: The Dilemma Faced by
the Judiciary, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1113, 1131 (1988) (calling for the American Law Institute to
adopt a uniform privilege rule for complex, multijurisdictional litigation). Curiously, the Comment
ignores the problem presented in the text-the uncertainty that unclear choice of law rules pro-
duce when only one forum is involved.
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riage 60 and real property. 161 In those areas, the modern approaches
generally revert to territorialism. The departure from the normal analy-
sis is justified by a special need for uniformity, predictability and cer-
tainty.162 For example, in discussing the marriage rule, Leflar, McDou-
gal, and Felix argue that "predictability . . . is as important here as in
any area of the law." 163 The place-of-the-marriage rule arises not from
territoriality but in part "from the fact that the parties need to know
reliably and certainly, and at once, whether they are married or
not.""" Similarly, the situs rule is applied to real'property questions
because "[p]redictability and uniformity of results . . . are of first im-
portance" in that area. 65 Thus, even the advocates of the modern ap-
proaches recognize that their general approaches are too uncertain and
too unpredictable in some cases.
The need for certainty and predictability has had surprisingly little
affect on choice of law involving the attorney-client privilege. Forum
law rules are inherently unpredictable; attorney and client usually do
not know when they communicate what the forum will be. Interest
analysis, the most significant relationship test, section 139 of the Sec-
ond Restatement, and the better law approach all require post hoc
judgments concerning the weight of state policy interests. Such tests
are inherently uncertain, more than one alternative is often logically
justifiable, 66 and attorney and client cannot reliably predict which law
any given court will choose. Thus, a flexible approach like interest anal-
ysis might achieve better results in particular cases,' 7 but only at the
160. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1969) (a mar-
riage valid where contracted will be recognized everywhere unless it violates a strong public policy
of the state with the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage); R. LEFLAR, L.
McDouCGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, § 220 (validity of a marriage determined by the law of
the state where the marriage occurred).
161. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 223-43 (1969) (law of
the situs applied to questions of title to real property); R. LEFLAR. L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX,
supra note 2, § 165 (same).
162. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 comment a (1969);
R. LEFLAR. L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, § 165, at 474, § 220, at 605.
163. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 2, § 220, at 605.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 165, at-474.
166. The ability to justify a decision logically has never been a strong concern of courts in
the conflicts area.
167. Even this is doubtful, given the way that courts manipulate or misunderstand interest
analysis.
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expense of the policies the attorney-client privilege was meant to
serve. 
1 68
A rule is needed, a rule that will allow client and attorney to know
at the time of their communication which state's privilege law will ap-
ply, and therefore whether their conversation is protected from disclo-
sure. Such a rule cannot be interest-based; as shown above, interest
analysis is inherently ambiguous. Such a rule cannot require a weigh-
ing or balancing of policies; no one can reliably predict in advance the
result of balancing. A rigid, territorial rule is the only choice-of-law
approach consistent with the objectives of the attorney-client privilege.
But what territorial rule?
Two possibilities may be rejected fairly easily. A law-of-the-forum
rule is territorial, but certainly not predictable at the time of the com-
munications. Application of the law of the state where the underlying
cause of action arose is also territorial, but again unpredictable. For
one thing, it is notoriously difficult to locate an interstate cause of ac-
tion in a particular state. The manipulation and disuniformity inherent
in that enterprise are reasons the First Restatement rules fell from
favor. Second, even assuming a court could accurately identify after
the fact where the cause of action "arose," attorney and client often
cannot do so at the time of their communication. If the client is seeking
advice about a potential transaction, no particular locus for the trans-
action may have been determined. Even if the transaction has already
occurred, attorney and client might find it difficult to predict where a
court would place the locus of the transaction.
The attorney and client can reliably identify only three states
when they communicate-the state in which the communication oc-
curs, the state of the attorney's practice, and the state of the client's
domicile.6 9 In many cases, these three may be the same state and the
168. One might object that a certain, predictable rule is not needed because the basic tenet
underlying the attorney-client privilege is flawed-clients will not be less candid if they do not
know their communications with their attorneys are protected. See supra note 157. That may be,
and this Article does not attempt to challenge or support that behavioral assumption. Complete
elimination of the attorney-client privilege might have no effect at all on communications between
attorney and client. But acceptance or rejection of that assumption is not the province of the
conflicts scholar or the court applying choice-of-law principles. For better or worse, courts and
legislatures have decided that the attorney-client privilege fosters communications between attor-
ney and client. Those who disagree with that assumption may attempt to eliminate the attorney-
client privilege. In the choice of law context, courts are faced with a choice between the law of two
states, each of which accepts the behavioral assumptions underlying the privilege.
169. The last two states-the attorney's state of practice and the client's domicile-may
change subsequent to the communication. Either the attorney or the client might relocate. Obvi-
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choice-of-law solution is easy. But what about the hard case where they
differ? Which of the three possible territorial rules should a court
choose, keeping in mind the policy objective of the attorney-client
privilege?
A state of communication rule presents unique problems justifying
its rejection. Its major flaw is that it does not provide the necessary
certainty and predictability. If the state of the communications has no
other connection to the case, attorney and client are unlikely to be fa-
miliar with its privilege law. They could research that law before they
confer, but that imposes a substantial cost on them to obtain certainty
and predictability. They could just assume that the state in which they
communicate has the same law as the privilege law with which they are
familiar, but they do so at the risk of being wrong. This possibility and
the likelihood of subsequent disclosure will chill their communications.
Their safest strategy would be to assume that the state of communica-
tions has a restrictive privilege law, and to curtail their communications
accordingly. Thus, a state of communications rule is likely to have a
lowest-common-denominator effect that chills attorney-client
communications.
In addition, there may be a problem in some cases identifying the
state of communication. 1 0 When the client is in one state and the at-
torney in another, and they communicate either by phone or the mails,
what is the situs of that communication? What about multiparty com-
munications, where each of the parties is located in different ,states?
What about communications on airplanes or trains or in
automobiles-does the privilege law suddenly change as the parties
cross a state line? More importantly, as indicated earlier, 71 there is no
ously, any subsequent move is usually unpredictable at the time of the communication. Later
references to the state of practice or to the client's domicile relate to the time of communication.
170. This problem is akin to the problem under the First Restatement of identifying the
place of contracting. See, e.g., Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638
(1958); Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 33, 101 S.E. 240 (1919).
Of course, a similar problem arises in identifying the state of the attorney's practice or the
state of the client's domicile. An attorney may practice in more than one state and it may be
difficult to determine the domicile of a client with a multistate presence. See infra text accompa-
nying note 173. It is difficult to say whether the proposed state of practice rule presents more
multistate choices than a state of communication rule. Most attorney-client communications occur
within a single state but most attorneys are only licensed to practice in a single state as well. In
any event, a state of communication rule can be rejected because the attorney's familiarity with
his own state's privilege enhances predictability. Further, the text proposes an easy way to deal
with multistate practitioners. See infra section V(B).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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policy reason to apply the law of the state where the communications
occurred. Absent some other connection to the case, attorney and client
are just passing through, and the state of the communications has little
regulatory interest in their communications.
The other two possible territorial rules are the attorney's state of
practice and the client's state of domicile. Either choice is justifiable, as
each of the two states has at least an arguable policy interest. On the
one hand, the privilege is designed to protect the client and is the cli-
ent's to assert or waive. This arguably makes the client's interest para-
mount and therefore the law of the client's domicile should be applied.
On the other hand, the attorney-client privilege is designed to increase
the effectiveness of the attorney's representation and surely the state of
practice has at least some interest in that goal.
When the focus shifts to the need for certainty and predictability,
however, the choice is clear. Of the two participants in the communica-
tion, only one, the attorney, is likely to know about the scope of the
privilege. 171 The client may have a generalized expectation of confiden-
tiality, but is unlikely to know or understand the details of his home
state privilege law. The attorney, on the other hand, engages in re-
peated communications with clients and ought to know the outlines of
the privilege law in her state of practice. The attorney will be expected
to advise the client as to the protection provided by the privilege and
not vice versa. If there is a question, the attorney can more quickly,
efficiently, and cheaply evaluate the privilege law of the state in which
she practices than she can the privilege law of some other, unfamiliar
state. Finally, applying the law of the attorney's state minimizes the
number of situations where more than one state qualifies. Although no
empirical work verifies this, a client with a multistate presence (e.g.,' a
national corporation) is more likely than an attorney with a multistate
presence. Thus, a state-of-the-attorney's-practice rule produces fewer
172. The proposed rule does not work particularly well for the knowledgeable client who
confers with attorneys in several states. For example, an insurance company doing business na-
tionwide will deal with attorneys in a number of different states. As a sophisticated repeat litiga-
tor, the insurance company is likely to be knowledgeable about legal rules, including the law of
privilege. It would be easier for the insurance company if a single privilege law-for example, the
law of its principal place of business-were applied instead of the various laws of the states where
its attorneys are located.
However, any other rule or approach-forum law, interest analysis, most significant relation-
ship--presents the same problem. The insurance company could not predict which law would
apply, and would have to analyze a number of different states' laws. Even a rule applying the law
of the company's principal place of business or some other rule based on the company's domicile
would lead to definitional problems. See Note, supra note 56, at 603-609.
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ambiguous results, and the second-level rule to resolve these multistate
situations becomes less important. The balance tips in favor of applying
the attorney-client privilege law of the attorney's state of practice.17
This rule may not always produce a result that makes conflicts
scholars comfortable. That is one of the drawbacks of generally appli-
cable rules; the result in the general run of cases should be "correct" or
acceptable, but there- will always be cases where the rule fits poorly.
Interest analysts abhor this possibility; the key idea underlying ap-
proaches like interest analysis is to allow judges to reach "correct,"
acceptable results in all cases. But an ad hoc, policy-based approach
sacrifices certainty and predictability, and those values must be para-
mount if the attorney-client privilege is to work. With no certainty con-
cerning the rule the court will choose, privilege law degenerates into
the lowest common denominator, and attorney-client communications
173. Professor Berger briefly proposes a rule similar to that in the text. Berger, Privileges,
Presumptions and Competency of Witnesses in Federal Court: A Federal Choice-of-Laws Rule,
42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 417, 449-450 (1976). She fails, however, to ground that choice in the need
for certainty and predictability and as a result makes exceptions to the rule that destroy its utility.
For example, if the court determined that the client had a "reasonable expectation" that some
other law would apply, she argues that the court should apply that other law. Id. at 450-51.
Second, if the communication is made in a state other than the state of practice, Professor Berger
would apparently apply the law of the state of practice only if the relationship "had its inception
there." Id. at 450 n.163. Finally, she appears willing to depart from a state of practice rule when
another state has a strong policy interest in applying its law. Id. at 453. Thus, what began as a
certain, predictable rule quickly evaporates into ambiguity.
The proposed rule would not change the result of some of the attorney-client privilege choice-
of-law cases. See McNulty v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Emejota
Eng'g Corp. v. Kent Polymers Inc., 1985 WL 4019 (E.D. Pa.); Brandman v. Cross & Brown Co.,
125 Misc. 2d 185, 479 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1984); Application of Walsh, 40 Misc. 2d 413, 243
N.Y.S.2d 325 (1963); Application of Franklin Washington Trust Co., I Misc. 2d 697, 148
N.Y.S.2d 731 (1956); In re Whitlock, 3 N.Y.S. 855 (1889).
A greater number of cases would be decided differently. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
694 F.2d 1256 (1lth Cir. 1982); Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring, 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972);
Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Willemijn Houdstermaastschaapij BV
v. Apollo Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Del. 1989); Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor
Technologies, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1987); Drimmer v. Appleton, 628 F. Supp. 1249
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974); Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 93 Ill. App. 3d 35, 416 N.E.2d 1090 (1980), vacated, 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432
N.E.2d 250 (1982).
In some cases, it is impossible to tell how the proposed rule would affect the result because
the attorney's state of practice is not adequately specified in the opinion. See ICI Americas Inc. v.
John Wanamaker, 1989 WL 38647 (E.D. Pa.); Command Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line (USA)
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Bandag Inc., 562 F. Supp. 439
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. ABC Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Tenn.
1979); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 47 (W.D. Pa.
1977).
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are chilled. Ad hoc approaches, like interest analysis, thus purport to
apply a more acceptable privilege law in particular cases only at the
expense of all privilege law.
This uncertainty and unpredictability might be more acceptable if
interest analysis and the other modern approaches delivered what they
promised, but they do not. These approaches produce as many "unac-
ceptable" results as would a rigid rule. As discussed above, courts do
not have the slightest idea how to apply the "preferred" approaches to
the attorney-client privilege. They choose a state with little explanation
and results vary widely from court to court. Thus, interest analysis, the
most significant relationship test, and the other modern approaches
provide little benefit to justify their cost in terms of certainty and
predictability.
Of course, the proposed rule does not itself produce absolute cer-
tainty or predictability. The attorney-client privilege is not absolutely
certain even independent of the problems created by choice-of-law deci-
sions. The extent of the privilege may be unclear on the fringes even
within the law of a single state. More importantly, the proposed rule
deals only with the uncertainty arising in the horizontal choice-of-law
context, the choice among the laws of the states. Left unsettled is the
uncertainty arising in the vertical, Erie choice-of-law context-the
choice between federal and state law. When a federal claim is asserted,
the federal law of privilege controls."7 ' Since attorney and client often
will not know when they confer whether the ultimate claim will be
state or federal or both, some uncertainty remains about the rule to be
applied, with a resulting chill on attorney-client communications. 17 5
This remaining uncertainty does not excuse adding additional un-
certainty in the horizontal choice-of-law context, however. The federal
rule should probably be changed and each individual state's attorney-
client privilege law should be clarified, but the more certain a client
and an attorney can be about the privilege, the better. Some uncer-
tainty does not excuse total abrogation of the rule of law.
The proposed choice-of-law rule is most effective, of course, only if
most states adopt it or if it is imposed on all states by federal legisla-
tion. Little benefit is provided if only a few states adopt a rule requiring
application of the law of the attorney's state of practice. Attorney and
client would still be unable to predict whose privilege law would apply
174. FED. R. EvID. 501.
175. Sterk, supra note 40, at 486 n.78; Berger, supra note 173, at 448; Weinstein, supra
note 69, at 548.
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because of the diversity of choice-of-law rules, and communications
would be chilled. The best solution would be federal choice-of-law leg-
islation mandating application of the law of the attorney's state of
practice, preferably for both state and federal claims. The infringement
on the states would be minor, because they would be free to develop
their own privilege law for domestic cases, and the need for certainty
and predictability would be served.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED RULE
A. The Possibility of Manipulation
The proposed rule creates a potential problem of manipulation.
What if a client purposely chooses an attorney from a state with a
strong privilege just to have the protection of that state's privilege? If
this occurred, states might be encouraged to broaden their attorney-
client privileges to attract legal business, resulting in a spiral of ever-
increasing privilege protection. 7" However; this is unlikely to happen.
For one thing, a client's choice of attorney is influenced by many
things-professional competence, availability, knowledge of the client's
business, and specialized expertise, for examples. Each of these attrib-
utes is likely to be more important than the scope of privilege protec-
tion. It is unlikely that a client will go to an attorney in another state
solely to get a broader attorney-client privilege.
Even if some clients choose attorneys because their states of prac-
tice have broader privileges, states are unlikely to compete for out-of-
state, legal business by broadening their privileges.. The primary appli-
176. This mirrors the "race to the bottom" argument in corporate law. Some scholars argue
that competition among the states for incorporations results in especially lax laws regulating cor-
porate governance. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Others have rejected this argument as economically unsound. See, e.g.,
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982); R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORA-
TION 7-11 (1978).
The similarity of these two arguments should not be surprising as the "race to the bottom,"
to the extent it occurs, also results from a conflicts rule. The internal affairs rule says that ques-
tions concerning the internal affairs of corporations, which include most issues of corporate gov-
ernance, are decided by the law of the state of incorporation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971). This rule may have constitutional dimensions. See CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987); id. at 95-96 (Scalia, J., concurring); Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982). The "race to the bottom" is possible only because
corporations doing business elsewhere can choose the rules controlling corporate governance by
their choice of state of incorporation. Similarly, under the proposed attorney-client privilege rule,
clients could choose the scope of their privilege by their choice of attorneys.
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cation of each state's attorney-client privilege will always be in inter-
nal, domestic cases; in defining its privilege, each state must therefore
balance the benefits of the privilege, including the attraction of new
legal business, against the cost in terms of loss of evidence in domestic
cases. The domestic costs will invariably dwarf the marginal gains in
interstate legal business. And a broader rule only for out-of-state cli-
ents would probably be unconstitutional. 17
B. Multiple Representation
Another problem the proposed rule presents is what to do in cases
of multiple representation. Assume that a client consults both Attorney
A, who practices in State A, and Attorney B, who practices in State B.
Should we apply the privilege law of State A or that of State B? If the
client communicates serially with the attorneys, first with Attorney A,
then separately with Attorney B, the answer is obvious. The privilege
law of State A should apply to the communications with Attorney A
and the privilege law of State B should apply to the communications
with Attorney B. Each attorney knows the privilege law. of her own
state, and can adjust her conduct and advise the client accordingly. The
client will know the extent to which each communication is protected.
But what if the client communicates with Attorney A and Attor-
ney B simultaneously? Or what if a single attorney practices in more
than one jurisdiction? How do we resolve this situation without gener-
ating the uncertainty that the proposed rule is designed to prevent?
The best answer is to apply the law of the attorney's state with the
weaker privilege. This promotes certainty-it is an easy, predictable
rule and it applies a law that at least one of the attorneys participating
in the communication will know. It also protects against manipulation
by the client. If any other rule applied, a client would have an incentive
to consult an attorney from a state with a strong privilege just to pro-
tect the communications. He could do so without compromising his le-
gal representation because his regular attorney would also be present.
Applying the weaker privilege of the two removes any incentive for ma-
nipulation. Adding attorneys from other states to a conversation will
never strengthen the client's protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis shows that interest analysis, the most sig-
177. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
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nificant relationship test, and other "modern" approaches fail when ap-
plied to an area of the law like the attorney-client privilege where cer-
tainty and predictability are essential. This is not an apology for the
traditional rules, because the First Restatement approach in this
area-the rule of forum preference-is equally inapt. But the problems
with the First Restatement do not condemn all territorial rules. Some-
times, as in the case of the attorney-client privilege, territorial rules are
essential. The mistake of many modern analysts is to generally reject
territorialism merely because a particular set of territorial rules, those
in the First Restatement, make no sense.
Without certainty and predictability, the policies underlying the
attorney-client privilege are frustrated. In the absence of a certain, pre-
dictable rule, attorney and client cannot know if their communications
will be protected and therefore will act as if they were not. Regardless
of the privilege rule the court ultimately chooses, attorney-client com-
munications are not fostered. To achieve the necessary certainty and
predictability, we must pick a territorial rule that works well in the
general run of cases.1 7 8
Courts applying a territorial rule will not always achieve the most
"just" result in every individual case. But ex ante predictability and ex
post justice are not completely compatible. For the same reasons that
we have rules of law rather than general principles of equity in other
areas of the law, we must often have clear, certain rules for choice of
law. 179 The inequitable results produced by those rules in the few cases
where the rule does not work well are the price we pay for certainty
and predictability. 80 The alternative is an approach like interest analy-
sis which, because it is uncertain and unpredictable, frustrates the pol-
icy of the attorney-client privilege entirely.
Territorial rules may also work well in answering other choice-of-
law questions. The need for certainty and predictability is not unique to
the attorney-client privilege. That, however, is a story best left for an-
other day. My thesis is more limited-to show that a territorial rule
works best in one discrete area of conflicts law. Given the goal of the
attorney-client privilege, the territorial solution proposed here is the
only sensible choice.
178. Reese, supra note 23, at 316.
179. Id. at 319.
180. "Perfection is not for this world. The advantages which good rules bring are worth the
price of an occasional doubtful result." Id. at 322.
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